Recruitment, Veto Players, and the Outcomes - Abstract

Recruitment of additional participants is one of the keys to achieving a successful outcome for a violent or nonviolent anti-government campaign (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Rather surprisingly, little generalizable empirical evidence exists regarding whether or not the recruitment of additional individuals and organizations into an ongoing campaign does indeed improve its prospects of achieving a successful outcome. ‘One of the keys to effective mass social action is the forging of alliances between social groups that are usually separate from, if not independent or even hostile to each other.’ (Garton Ash 2009: 379). However, recruitment of diverse actors can carry its own problems. If recruitment takes the form of additional individual recruits, then this may go a long way towards determining the success of the campaign. However, if recruitment takes the form of attracting additional organizations into the fray, then this runs the risk of introducing new veto players who can derail the campaign’s plans and opportunities for success. A series of Heckman-style selection models demonstrate tentative support for our hypotheses.